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11.1 Introduction
Under current (1985) law, corporate income is taxed only when pos-
itive. Although losses can be carried back to generate tax refunds up
to the amount of taxes paid in the previous three years, losses must
be carried forward once these tax refunds are used up. The present
value per dollar carried forward is less than the statutory rate for two
reasons: the firm may not earn enough to use the carryforwards before
they expire, and carryforwards do not earn interest.
In previous work (Majd and Myers 1985), we showed that tax asym-
metries can be modeled and valued as contingent claims, using option
pricing theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation. Although the
asymmetries' effects cannot be expressed in conventional summary
measures such as effective tax rates, we did work out impacts on the
after-tax net present values (NPVs) of incremental investment outlays.
Tax asymmetries can dramatically reduce after-tax NPVs for high-risk
investments, although the extent of reduction depends on the tax po-
sition of the investing firm. Tax asymmetries are irrelevant at the margin
for a firm with sufficient other income that it always pays taxes on a
marginal dollar of income or loss. Asymmetries may be the dominant
tax effect for "stand-alone" projects, that is, for cases where the proj-
ect and the firm are the same.
Saman Majd is assistant professor of finance at the Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania. Stewart C. Myers is Gordon Y Billard Professor of Finance at the Sloan
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and research associate
at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
This chapter develops previous work (Majd and Myers 1985). Comments on that paper
from Alan Auerbach, Henry Jacoby, Michael Keen and Colin Mayer have significantly
improved this chapter.
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Here we focus on the design of the corporate income tax. We report
the results of a series of numerical experiments comparing current
(1985) tax law with a stylized tax "reform" proposal, with tax asym-
metries of course emphasized. In doing so we have also improved the
methods we used previously, notably by using more realistic and con-
sistent numerical parameters.
We have also included an intelligent, although not fully optimal,
project abandonment strategy in the simulations. The abandonment
strategy links project life to ex post profitability. We constructed this
link because fixing project life ex ante does not make sense under
uncertainty, and because the extent to which tax-loss carryforwards
can relieve tax asymmetries ought to depend on decisions about project
life.
Section 11.2 briefly reviews prior work by others. Section 11.3 de-
scribes how option pricing concepts can be applied to value the gov-
ernment's tax claim on risky assets. Since no closed-form option-pricing
formulas apply, values must be computed by numerical methods. Sec-
tion 11.3, backed up by an appendix, also describes our calculations
in more detail and presents after-tax values for a reasonably realistic
' 'representative project'' under various assumptions about project prof-
itability, risk, and the tax position of the firm owning it. Section 11.4
investigates how the impact of tax asymmetries changes when a styl-
ized, reformed tax system is substituted for the 1985 corporate tax law.
Section 11.5 offers some concluding comments.
11.2 Prior Work
Formal analysis of the impacts of asymmetric taxation is just begin-
ning to appear in the finance literature. For example, Cooper and Franks
(1983) recognize that the firm's future tax rates are endogenous under
asymmetric taxation with carryforward privileges. They use a linear
programming framework to analyze the interaction between present
and future investment and financing decisions induced by the tax sys-
tem. They discuss some of the factors that limit financial transactions
designed to offset tax losses and conclude that real investment by
corporations can be distorted.
Ball and Bowers (1983), Galai (1983), Smith and Stultz (1983), Pitts
and Franks (1984), and Green and Talmor (1985) all have noted the
analogy between asymmetric taxes and call options. However, none
of these papers has introduced realistic elements of the law, such as
tax-loss carry provisions, nor have they obtained numerical estimates
of the impact of tax asymmetries on asset values.
Building on earlier work in Auerbach (1983), Auerbach and Poterba
(this volume) investigate the effects of tax asymmetries on corporate345 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
investment incentives. They take the tax position of the firm as ex-
ogenous and use estimates of the tax losses carried forward by a sample
of corporations to estimate the probability that the firm will pay taxes
in the future. They compute effective marginal tax rates on new in-
vestment using these "transition probabilities."
The assumption that the future tax position of the firm is exogenous
may be reasonable for incremental investment decisions that are small
compared with the other assets of the firm. However, this approach
cannot handle investment decisions when the project must "stand alone"
or when it is a significant part of the assets of the firm. Moreover, as
Auerbach and Poterba note, using past data on tax-loss carryforwards
will not allow them to analyze proposed changes in tax law, since the
change in tax regime will also change the transition probabilities they
estimate.
By contrast, we take future pretax cash flows of the firm or project
as completely exogenous and thus can allow the future tax position of
the firm or project to be completely endogenous. This approach can
shed light on effects of proposed changes corporate tax law.
11.3 Taxes as Contingent Claims
In the absence of tax loss carrybacks or carryforwards, the govern-
ment's tax claim is equivalent to a portfolio of European call options,















Fig. 11.1 Taxes paid as a function of taxable income.346 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
shows taxes paid as a function of taxable income in a given year and
has the same shape as a call option's payoff at exercise.
This option payoff function also describes the taxes paid on the
income of a stand-alone project (i.e., taxes paid by a firm undertaking
only one project). But in general the taxes paid on a project's income
depend on the tax position of the firm owning it. Suppose the project
is owned by IBM. It seems safe to say that IBM will not have tax-loss
carryforwards at any time in the foreseeable future and will pay taxes
at the margin at the full statutory rate. Thus any project losses can be
offset against IBM's other income. The tax system is symmetrical for
IBM when it considers an incremental capital investment project.
We can express these option analogies more formally. Consider a
project that is the firm's only asset. Let the pretax operating cash flow
and depreciation allowance at time t be y, and dt respectively. Ignore
for now the investment tax credit (ITC) and assume that the project is
all-equity financed. In the absence of tax-loss carryforwards or carry-
backs, the project's after-tax cash flow at time t is:
c, = y, - T max [y, - dt, 0].
The after-tax cash flow is the difference between the pretax operating
cash flow and the government's claim on it. The government's claim
is equivalent to T European call options on the operating cash flow with
exercise prices equal to the depreciation allowances.
Since the government taxes the firm's total income, the incremental
effect of a new project on the value of the firm depends on the operating
cash flows of the firm's existing assets and on their correlation with
project cash flows. The after-tax cash flow for the firm and project is:
ct - (yt + zt) ~ T max [(yt + z,) ~ (dt + dzt), 0],
where z, is the operating cash flow and dzt the depreciation allowance
for the firm without the new project. Because the government's claim
is an option, the value of the tax claim on the sum of yt and zt is not
the sum of the values of the tax claims on each taken separately.
Tax-loss carry privileges do not change the shape of the contingent
tax payment drawn in figure 11.1. If the firm does not begin paying
taxes until that year's taxable income exceeds cumulative tax losses
carried forward from previous years, the vertical dividing line shifts to
the right. Carrybacks shift the horizontal dividing line down from zero
by the sum of taxes paid over the previous three years.
Again we can state this formally. Consider the case of unlimited
carryforwards (but without any carrybacks). The tax loss carried for-
ward to time t from the previous period is:
8, = max [8,_! + dt_x - yt_u 0].347 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
The carryforward depends on the carryforward in the previous period,
which in turn depends on the still-earlier carryforward, and so on. The
carryforward at the beginning of the project (time zero) is given. The
after-tax cash flow becomes:
ct = yt - T max [y, - dt - 0,, 0].
Since 6, depends on all realized incomes before time t, the payoff to
the government (i.e., the tax paid) also depends on the realized in-
comes. It is straightforward to introduce the ITC and carrybacks and
to limit the length of time allowed for carryforwards.
The carry privileges do not break the correspondence between the
government's tax claims and a series of call options. The government
holds a lottery across many possible options on yt. Which option it
ends up with depends on the firm's history of operating cash flow, y0,
y\-> • • •> yt-i- This particular form of path dependency makes it in-
feasible to use closed-form option-valuation formulas.
Therefore, with carryforwards and carrybacks, developing compar-
ative statics is a numerical rather than an analytical exercise. However,
despite the complexity of the government's contingent claim, we have
found no instances in which carry privileges reverse the normal prop-
erties of call options. For example, we have always found that the
present value of the government's tax claim on a stand-alone project
increases with project risk, denned as the variance rate at which cash
flows evolve, and also with project life. The government is better off
if nominal interest rates increase, even if tax depreciation is indexed
to inflation. Of course all of these results can be shown analytically,
using the Black and Scholes (1973) formula, if carry privileges are
ignored and the government's tax claim is modeled as a series of non-
interacting calls, one for each year's cash flow.
11.3.1 Valuing the Government's Tax Claim
This section describes the numerical procedure used to calculate the
present value (to the corporation) of the taxes paid on a risky project.
Our discussion will be restricted to finding the present value of the
taxes paid on an operating cash flow in year t, yt, in the presence of
unlimited carryforwards. The present value of the taxes paid on the
stream of operating cash flows is simply the sum of the values of the
claims on each future year's operating income. Extension of the pro-
cedure to include carrybacks and to limit the carryforward period is
straightforward.
We exploit a general property of options first explicitly noted by Cox
and Ross (1976): if the payoff to the option can be replicated by a
portfolio strategy using traded securities, the present value of the option
is the expected payoff forecasted under a risk-neutral stochastic pro-348 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
cess (conditional on the current values of the relevant state variables)
and discounted at the risk-free rate. In other words, the option can be
valued as if both it and the underlying asset are traded in a risk-neutral
world.
The reason this risk-neutral valuation principle works is that options
are not valued absolutely, but only relative to the underlying asset. For
example, the Black and Scholes (1973) formula establishes only the
ratio of call value to stock price. The stock price is marked down for
risk because investors discount forecasted dividends at a risk-adjusted
rate. The markdown of the stock to a current, certainty-equivalent
value marks down the call value too, but not the ratio of call value to
stock price.
The call is in fact riskier than the stock it is written on, and if at any
instant investors demand an expected rate of return above the risk-
free rate to hold the stock, they will demand a still higher return to
hold the call. Suppose the required rate of return on the stock shifts
up by enough to reduce the stock price by 1%. Then the call value will
fall by more than 1%. However, the change in the stock's required
return is not needed to calculate the fall in the call price. The change
in stock price is a sufficient statistic.
Of course, the assets and options we are analyzing here are not
explicitly traded. That may seem to violate a central assumption of the
Black-Scholes model and its progeny. But we have actually taken only
a small step away from the standard finance theory of capital investment
under uncertainty. That theory assumes the firm maximizes market
value, which in turn requires capital markets sufficiently complete that
investors can find a security or portfolio of securities to "match" any
investment project the firm may embark on. For every real asset, there
must be a trading strategy using financial assets that generates a perfect
substitute for the project in time pattern and risk characteristics of
future cash returns. That assumption is routinely made for publicly
traded firms. Incomplete markets are usually treated as a second- or
third-order problem in light of the exceedingly rich menu of financial
assets and trading strategies.
If investors can replicate real investment projects by trading in fi-
nancial assets, they can also replicate options written on those projects
by trading in the replicating assets and borrowing or lending. The heart
of the classic Black and Scholes (1973) paper is the demonstration that
a call's payoff can be exactly matched by a strategy of buying the
underlying stock on margin, according to a hedging rule for the amount
of stock held and the margin amount at each instant. Hedging rules
can be written down for more complex or compound options. Thus, if
markets are complete enough to support a market value standard for
real assets, they are complete enough to support use of option-pricing
theory.349 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
There are other ways of justifying option-pricing techniques for op-
tions on nontraded assets. For example, the techniques also follow in
the traditional capital asset pricing framework provided that asset re-
turns are multivariate normal and there is a representative investor
with constant absolute risk aversion (see, e.g., Brennan 1979 and Rub-
instein 1976).
11.3.2 Solution Techniques
The path dependencies in our problem rule out closed-form solutions
for the value of the government's tax claim. Moreover, these path
dependencies would overwhelm the usual numerical option-valuation
routines.
Fortunately, the rules for computing taxes are exogenous. Future tax
payments are always unknown, but there are no decisions to be made
about taxes. If the firm has the opportunity to use carrybacks or carry-
forwards, it does so at the first opportunity.
1 As far as taxes and carry
privileges are concerned, the firm faces only an event tree, not a de-
cision tree.
We can therefore employ a Monte Carlo simulation technique to
approximate the distribution of the payoff conditional on the prior
sequence of operating cash flow.
2 The rule determining the carryback
or carryforward at any time (the path-dependent feature in this problem)
is specified exogenously and depends only on past realizations of the
operating cash flow. The Monte Carlo simulation technique exploits
this feature of the problem by simulating the sequence of cash flows.
Each time a value is generated for the cash flow yt, the tax liability in
t and any carryforward to period t + 1 are completely determined.
The simulation must also update the distributions of future cash flows
every time a value is generated. Different assumptions about the sto-
chastic process generating the time series of operating cash flow are
possible. In our calculations, we break down operating cash flow as:
operating cash flow = net revenues - fixed costs, yt = xt - FCt,
where "net revenues" means revenues less variable costs. We assume
that FCt is known with certainty, and that the stochastic processes
generating each year's net revenue are perfectly correlated lognormal
diffusions. That is, the forecast error in any one year's net revenue
causes the same proportional change in the expectations of all future
net revenues and the same proportional change in the present value of
each year's future net revenues. If this assumption seems unduly re-
strictive, note that it is the usual justification for using a single risk-
adjusted rate to discount a stream of cash flows. Thus it implicitly
underlies standard practice (see Myers and Turnbull 1977 and Fama
1977).
The world of the simulation, however, is risk-neutral. Here is an
example of how forecasting and discounting work in that world. Sup-350 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
pose forecasted net revenues grow at a rate g and are properly dis-
counted at a rate r + p, where r is the risk-free interest rate and p is
a risk premium:
Jo -& dt = r(l -
r + p - g
In the risk-neutral world of the simulation, discounting is at r, but the
growth rate is reduced to g = g -p. Note that this does not change
the present value calculated just above: g could be interpreted as a
certainty-equivalent growth rate. This rate g would be used in the
simulation.
By generating a large number of simulated cash flows, an approxi-
mate distribution for the government's tax payment in each year is
obtained. The expected value is computed and discounted at the risk-
less rate to obtain the present value of the payment. The present value
of the government's claim on the project is the sum of the present value
of the claims on individual cash flows.
11.3.3 Limitations of Monte Carlo Simulation for Tax Analysis
Our method is limited because it cannot capture possible links be-
tween the future tax position of the firm and its investment and financing
decisions.
Our numerical procedure must take project and firm cash flows as
exogenous. We do not consider whether a future tax loss on a project
undertaken today will affect future investment decisions. We also rule
out cases in which today's project is managed differently, depending
on its (or the firm's) tax position. This is undoubtedly unrealistic. For
example, an otherwise profitable firm might find it less painful to stick
with a losing project in order to establish an immediate tax loss, for
the same reason that investors in securities often find it worthwhile to
realize capital losses before the end of the tax year.
3
This is one of several ways a firm can react to tax asymmetries. Four
additional examples are: (1) the firm may change its accounting policies
to shift taxable income over time; (2) the firm may seek to acquire
another firm that has taxable income; (3) the firm may choose to "sell"
its tax shields to another firm by a leasing arrangement;
4 (4) the firm
may issue equity and buy bonds in order to generate taxable income.
5
We admit that our results are uninteresting if firms can cash in tax
losses at or near face value by these or other transactions. The trans-
actions are not costless, however, and in many cases fall far short of
exhausting the entire tax loss. Auerbach and Poterba (this volume) find
that the percentages of a large sample of nonfinancial corporations with
tax loss carryforwards ranged from about 7 (1981) to 14 (1984). In some351 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
industries the percentages were substantially higher. For example, 30%
of airline companies had loss carryforwards in 1981 and 40% had them
in 1984. They also find that once a firm falls into loss carryforwards,
there is less than a 10% chance of climbing out in the following year.
6
If "selling tax losses" was feasible for these firms, the selling price
was not attractive for 90% of them.
Our analysis, since it assumes operating cash flows are exogenous,
gives a lower bound on after-tax project value and an upper bound on
the impact of tax asymmetries.
7 It shows the potential gain from chang-
ing financing or investment decisions to shift taxes over time or between
firms. Since we do not analyze these tax-shifting decisions specifically,
we cannot give point estimates of the effect of tax asymmetries under
current law. We can make useful comparisons of corporate tax reform
proposals, however. If the potential cost of tax asymmetries is reduced
under a new tax law, that law is better than the old one, other things
equal, because it reduces the real costs firms are willing to incur to sell
carryforwards, and because tax asymmetries are less likely to distort
real investment decisions.
11.3.4 Example of Numerical Results
Table 11.1 and figure 11.2 show results for the base-case project that
is described in detail in the Appendix. The project offers exponentially
decaying net revenues, moderate fixed costs, and under certainty would
have an economic life of twelve years. Inflation is / = .06 and the
nominal risk-free rate is r = .08. The standard deviations of annual
forecast errors for project cash flow are ux = .15, .10, and .25. In this









































Note: Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX) and asymmetric tax with and
without carry provisions (ASYMTAX and NOCARRY) for a range of pretax profitability
(ZEROTAX). The parameters for the calculations correspond to the base case described






























Fig. 11.2 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform with in-
dexed depreciation. The parameters are for the base case
described in the Appendix. Key: • ZEROTAX + SYM-
TAX OASYMTAX A NOCARRY.
Four sets of numbers are shown in the table and plotted in the figure.
These correspond to various extreme assumptions about the firm un-
dertaking the project.
Suppose the project is owned by a firm like Penn Central with such
large tax loss carryforwards that we may assume a zero effective tax
rate on new projects. We will use ZEROTAX as a label for this extreme
case in which pretax and after-tax NPV are the same.
At the other extreme, we can imagine the standard project under-
taken by a firm taxed symmetrically on marginal investment because
it is sure to pay taxes at the margin at the full statutory rate. We label
this case SYMTAX.
The NPVs in table 11.1 are calculated under a stylized tax-reform
law, with indexed, exponential tax depreciation to scrap value at the
end of the project's or asset's economic life. The tax rate is T = .33.
There is no investment tax credit. The Appendix reviews tax and nu-
merical assumptions in more detail.
The project's values under ZEROTAX and SYMTAX provide two
extreme cases. A third extreme case occurs when the firm and the
project are the same. Tax asymmetries have their maximum impact for353 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
stand-alone projects. Of course, carrybacks and carryforwards mitigate
the effects of the asymmetry. We assume three-year carrybacks and
fifteen-year carryforwards (i.e., the current [1985] system). Results for
stand-alone projects are labeled ASYMTAX. The ASYMTAX NPVs
shown under "Reform" in table 11.1 are also plotted in figure 11.2.
The remaining numbers in table 11.1 and figure 11.2, labeled NO-
CARRY, show the after-tax NPV of the stand-alone project with no
carryforwards or carrybacks of losses allowed. Figure 11.2 shows that
the NOCARRY NPVs are, as expected, somewhat worse than the
ASYMTAX NPVs. Although carry privileges are valuable, they do not
solve the tax asymmetry problem. We will not plot or comment on
NOCARRY NPVs in the rest of the chapter.
Stand-alone project NPV (ASYMTAX) is always lower than either
pretax NPV or NPV under a symmetric tax. A firm forced to take a
negative NPV project would prefer a symmetric tax if it had the choice;
second choice is no tax at all. A firm with a strongly positive NPV
project would prefer no tax, but second choice is a symmetric tax. At
some pretax NPV around zero, the firm is indifferent between no tax
and symmetric tax. But the asymmetric tax is always in third place
from the firm's point of view. It is furthest behind when pretax NPV
is about zero.
In other words, if the firm must have unused tax loss carryforwards,
it is better to have a lot of them, so that incremental investments
effectively escape tax. The present value of the government's tax claim
on a firm or stand-alone project is greatest when it is not known whether
the firm or project will have to pay taxes.
Most of the following discussion focuses on experiments where NO-
TAX or SYMTAX NPVs are not too far away from zero. Tax law is
most likely to affect decisions about breakeven or near-breakeven in-
vestments. Investments with high positive or negative NPVs will be
taken or rejected regardless of tax.
11.4 Tax Asymmetries and Tax Reform
So far we have confirmed the results of our prior work, that tax
asymmetries can have a significant impact on the after-tax value of
incremental investment. Now we arrive at the main goal of this chapter,
which is to compare the potential impacts of tax asymmetries under
current (1985) tax law with their impacts under a reformed law with
lower marginal rates, exponential depreciation approximating eco-
nomic depreciation, and no investment tax credit.
Compare the after-tax NPVs shown under "Reform" in table 11.2
with the after-tax NPVs under current law, shown on the right of the

























































































































































































Note: Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX), asymmetric tax with carry provisions
(ASYMTAX), and their difference (DIFF) for a range of pretax profitability (ZEROTAX).
Each panel corresponds to a different level of project risk (CT) and compares a stylized tax
reform (with indexed depreciation) with current law (ACRS).
11.3, 11.4, and 11.5, which plot after-tax NPVs for SYMTAX and
ASYMTAX against pretax project profitability measured by ZEROTAX
NPV. Each figure shows NPVs for a different standard deviation of
project cash flows.
For a firm facing symmetric taxation on marginal investments, reform
reduces after-tax NPV when pretax NPV is negative or moderately
positive. This reflects the loss of the investment tax credit and accel-
erated depreciation. Such a firm is better off when it finds projects with
strong positive NPVs, however, because reform lowers the marginal


























































































































































































Note: Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX), asymmetric tax with carry provisions
(ASYMTAX), and their difference (DIFF) for a range of pretax profitability (ZEROTAX).
Each panel corresponds to a different level of inflation (/) and compares a stylized tax reform
(without indexed depreciation) with current law (ACRS).
Reform decreases the present value of taxes on stand-alone projects,
except at large negative pretax NPVs. In those cases the project is
abandoned almost immediately, before any taxes are paid under either
current or reformed tax rules. Notice that the ASYMTAX NPVs equal
the NOTAX NPVs in the top row of the base-case and low-risk blocks
of table 11.2.
SYMTAX and ASYMTAX NPVs are equal at very high pre-tax NPVs,
not shown in table 11.2 and off-scale in figures 11.3-11.5. When the
stand-alone project is so profitable that it always pays taxes, tax asym-



























































































































































































Note: Values are shown for symmetric tax (SYMTAX), asymmetric tax with carry provisions
(ASYMTAX), and their difference (DIFF) for a range of pretax profitability (ZEROTAX).
Each panel corresponds to a different level of inflation (0 and compares the stylized tax reform
(with indexed depreciation) with and without interest in carryforwards.
But in the interesting cases where pretax NPV is moderately positive
or negative, stand-alone projects are worth more under reform despite
the loss of the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation. They
are worth more relative to projects taxed symmetrically or not taxed
at all.
These conclusions hold over a range of cash flow standard deviations,
as figures 11.3-11.5 illustrate. We have also checked to confirm that
they hold for projects with faster and slower tax and economic depre-
ciation, and that they hold when the option to shorten or extend project
life is "turned off" and project life is fixed at what it would be under













4. NPVs with Project Life Fixed at Twelve Years
-3.7 -3.7 -1.2 -7.5
-3.1 -8.6 -0.7 -17.1
-2.4 -12.5 -0.2 -17.1
B. NPVs with Option to Abandon before Year 12 or to Extend Life to Year 100
.0
3 -0.6 -3.7 -3.7 -1.2 -7.5
.15 26.8 15.4 14.1 14.2 8.8
.25 54.8 34.2 31.7 29.3 23.0
Note: NPV as percentage of project investment. Initial profitability and other project
assumptions are given in table 11.A.I.
aWe actually used ax ~ .001 in the Monte Carlo simulation. Note that the option to
abandon early or extend project life become valueless as ax —» 0. Thus the figures in the
first row of each panel are the same.
The results in these columns should in principle be identical in Panel A. Differences







Fig. 11.3 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform with in-
dexed depreciation versus ACRS. The parameters are for the
base case described in the Appendix. Key: • ZEROTAX
+ SYMTAX (reform) 0 ASYMTAX (reform) A SYM-























Fig. 11.4 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform with in-
dexed depreciation versus ACRS, when cash flow volatility
is 10% (other parameters are for the base case described in
the Appendix). Key: • ZEROTAX + SYMTAX (re-
form) 0 ASYMTAX (reform) A SYMTAX (ACRS)
x ASYMTAX (ACRS).
11.4.1 Indexing Depreciation
Table 11.3 and figures 11.6, 11.7, and 11.8 show NPVs when reform
does not include indexed tax depreciation. (The definitions of indexed
and nonindexed depreciation are reviewed in the Appendix.) The for-
mat is identical to that of table 11.2 except that cash flow standard
deviation is held at ax = .15 and the inflation rate is varied from .06
(the base case) to .12 and zero. Note that the "Reform" NPVs cal-
culated under zero inflation match the base case NPVs in table 11.2,
except for minor numerical errors introduced by the Monte Carlo
simulation.
Without indexing higher inflation naturally means lower after-tax
NPVs. Otherwise the patterns we noted in table 11.2 remain in table
11.3. Reform hurts symmetrically taxed projects when pretax NPV is
below or around zero, but helps when pretax NPV is strongly positive.
Stand-alone projects are uniformly helped, both absolutely and relative




Fig. 11.5 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform with in-
dexed depreciation versus ACRS, when cash flow volatility
is 25% (other parameters are for the base case described in
the Appendix). Key: • ZEROTAX + SYMTAX (re-
form) 0 ASYMTAX (reform) A SYMTAX (ACRS)
x ASYMTAX (ACRS).
11.4.2 Paying Interest on Tax-Loss Carryforwards
Paying interest on tax-loss carryforwards is a natural remedy for tax
asymmetries. However, it is not necessarily a complete remedy. Paying
interest on carryforwards works if the firm is sure to pay taxes even-
tually. If not, the government's option retains value, just as a call option
does if the exercise price increases at the interest rate.
Table 11.4 and figure 11.9 show the extent to which the remedy
works. Even with interest on carryforwards, there is a gap between
ASYMTAX and SYMTAX NPVs. Consider the base-case project at a
profitability level yielding a pretax NPV of 7.97 and an after-tax NPV
under symmetric taxation of 3.21. (See the top block of numbers in
table 11.4.) Allowing interest on carryforwards increases ASYMTAX
NPV from 1.05 to 1.19. This represents an improvement but does not
eliminate the effects of the asymmetry. Allowing interest on carryfor-
wards makes less difference (compared with reform without interest)
when pretax value is very low (ASYMTAX approaches ZEROTAX) or






Fig. 11.6 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform without
indexed depreciation versus ACRS. The parameters are for
the base case described in the Appendix. Key: • ZERO-
TAX + SYMTAX (reform) 0 ASYMTAX (reform)
A SYMTAX (ACRS) x ASYMTAX (ACRS).
The other two panels in table 11.4 show the effect of interest on
carryforwards when inflation is zero or 12%: allowing interest makes
a bigger difference to ASYMTAX NPV when inflation is high, but the
effect of the asymmetries remains.
Allowing interest on loss carryforwards completely removes the bur-
den of tax asymmetries only if the stand-alone firm or project is certain
to regain tax-paying status sooner or later. But on this point full cer-
tainty requires immortality for the firm or project and no limit on the
carryforward period. In our simulations the investment project may
live to year 100—probably a good approximation of immortality—but
it may be abandoned much earlier if its ex post performance is poor.
The gap between SYMTAX and ASYMTAX NPVs with interest on
carryforwards shows that carryforwards have no value to dead projects.
Now if tax law allowed the firm to add a life insurance premium as well
as interest to unused loss carryforwards, the potential extra burden of
tax asymmetries would be essentially eliminated. The life insurance
premium would equal the probability that the firm generating the carry-






Fig. 11.7 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform without
indexed depreciation versus ACRS, when inflation is 0% (other
parameters are for the base case described in the Appendix).
Key: • ZEROTAX + SYMTAX (reform) 0 ASYM-
TAX (reform) A SYMTAX (ACRS) x ASYMTAX
(ACRS).
11.4.3 Uncertainty and Abandonment
We conclude with a brief comment on the role of uncertainty and
abandonment strategy in our simulation results.
Figures 11.3-11.5 confirm that the present value of the government's
tax claim on a firm or stand-alone project increases with the risk (stan-
dard deviation) of the firm's or project's cash flows. But not all of the
differences between SYMTAX and ASYMTAX NPVs can be attributed
to risk. Some would persist under certainty, simply because the stand-
alone project may not be profitable enough, at least in its early years,
to use all the tax shields allotted to it.
Panel A of table 11.5 gives NPVs when risk disappears. First read
across the row labeled <TX = 0. The ZEROTAX NPV is effectively zero.
Under Reform tax assumptions, NPV is about -4% of project in-
vestment for both a tax-paying firm (SYMTAX) and the stand-alone
project. Now read down the columns under "Reform": as risk in-
creases, there is no change in SYMTAX NPVs (the small differences



















Fig. 11.8 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform without
indexed depreciation versus ACRS, when inflation is 12%
(other parameters are for the base case described in the Ap-
pendix). Key: • ZEROTAX + SYMTAX (reform)
0 ASYMTAX (reform) A SYMTAX (ACS)
x ASYMTAX (ACRS).
but a steady decrease in after-tax NPVs for the stand-alone project.
At least for projects like those examined in this chapter—projects with
smooth downward trends in operating income—tax asymmetries have
virtually no effect in the absence of risk. They increase the tax burden
on incremental investment in risky assets but not on investment in safe
assets.
The results grouped under "ACRS" in panel A tell a different story.
The present value of the government's tax claim on the stand-alone
project is about -7% of project investment (-7.5 vs. -0.6). The
present value of taxes increases further as risk increases, but clearly
the largest part of the damage done to the ASYMTAX NPVs can be
traced to deferral of the stand-alone project's investment tax credit
and ACRS write-offs.
The NPVs in panel A of table 11.5 were calculated after "turning
off" the option to abandon the project early or to extend its life beyond
its optimal life under certainty. We wanted to show how asymmetric
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Fig. 11.9 Project NPV as a function of pretax NPV: reform (with in-
dexed depreciation) with and without interest on carryfor-
wards. The parameters are for the base case described in the
Appendix. Key: • ZEROTAX + SYMTAX (with inter-
est) 0 ASYMTAX (with interest) A ASYMTAX (with-
out interest).
Panel B shows what happens when the option is turned on again.
The option sharply increases pretax NPVs as risk increases, because
the firm can bail out of the project, recovering part of the initial capital
outlay, if ex post performance is poor but continue almost indefinitely
if performance is sufficiently good. The option likewise increases after-
tax NPVs, even for the stand-alone project. In other words, additional
risk adds more value to the option to abandon early or extend than it
adds to the government's call options on project cash flows. The gov-
ernment's options still have significant value, however. For example,
when crx = .25, they are worth 3% of project investment under tax
reform (34.2 vs. 31.7) and 6.3% of investment under current law (29.3
vs. 23.0). Note that the latter difference is less than the comparable
difference for vx = 0. Thus, under current law, the option to abandon
or extend may interact with the government's call options to reduce
the value of those options as risk increases. That does not, however,
affect the main results of this chapter, which rest on comparisons of
after-tax NPVs at given risk levels under current tax law and stylized364 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
tax reform. The potential costs and distortions introduced by tax asym-
metries depend on the differences between SYMTAX and ASYMTAX
NPVs at given levels of investment risk. Under current tax law, these
differences are dramatic regardless of risk and regardless of whether
the option to abandon or extend project life is "turned on." Under our
stylized tax reform the differences are much smaller.
11.4.4 Investment in Intangible Assets
Our tax reform is too pure for real life. Many of the impurities of
actual tax reform make the potential costs of tax reform worse. For
example, the results presented so far overstate the difference reform
might make because most reform proposals continue to allow corpo-
rations to expense investment in intangibles. Research and develop-
ment (R&D) outlays are expensed, for example, as are most startup
costs and advertising, which is sometimes intended to generate payoffs
in the medium or long term.
Under current law, the present values of tax shields generated by
investment in tangible and intangible assets are roughly the same. That
is, the present value of ACRS write-offs plus the investment tax credit
is roughly equal to the cost of the asset, and therefore roughly equiv-
alent to writing off the asset when it is bought. High-tech companies
that invest largely in R&D or other intangibles are not materially dis-
advantaged compared with smokestack companies that invest in tan-
gible capital assets, providing both types of companies pay taxes year
in and year out at the same marginal rate.
For stand-alone projects, however, shifting investment from tangible
to intangible assets makes the burden of tax asymmetries worse. More-
over, that burden is carried over to tax reform proposals that allow
intangible investments to be expensed.
In other words, tax reform that sets economically sensible tax de-
preciation schedules only for tangible assets will tend to slant invest-
ment toward R&D and other intangibles: high-tech companies will gain
relative to smokestack companies as long as both types pay taxes
regularly. However, the potential burden of tax asymmetries on high-
tech projects or companies will remain substantial.
11.5 Summary
In this chapter we combine option-pricing theory with Monte Carlo
simulation to derive numerical estimates of the potential effects of tax
asymmetries. We confirm earlier results showing that asymmetries can
have substantial effects on the after-tax NPVs of incremental invest-
ment projects. We go on to a more refined and detailed investigation,
comparing current (1985) law with a stylized reform that eliminates the365 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
investment tax credit and sets tax depreciation approximately equal to
economic depreciation. The reformed marginal corporate tax rate is
33%.
This reform would increase the present value of taxes on incremental
investments by firms that always pay taxes but decrease the present
value of taxes on stand-alone projects. Reform dramatically reduces
the potential burden of tax asymmetries.
The magnitude of these shifts in tax burden of course depends on
numerical assumptions. However, the direction of the effects holds up
over all our experiments. The experiments varied risk, the rate of
economic depreciation, and the ratio of fixed to variable cost. We also
generated results under reform with and without inflation indexing of
tax depreciation, and with and without interest on tax-loss carryfor-
wards. Although these measures help, they do not completely eliminate
the effects of tax asymmetries.
There is more work to be done. For example, we would like to model
uncertain inflation and develop a better understanding of its effects on
value under asymmetric taxation. We expect our general conclusions
to continue to hold, but this will enable us to make better recommen-
dations regarding inflation indexing and its likely impact on asset values.
Although our methodology allows us to analyze a wide variety of
tax codes in considerable detail, it requires that the pretax cash flows
of the firm or project not be affected by the tax rules. There are in-
teresting issues regarding the effect of the tax system on the distribution
of future cash flows that we have not addressed.
Appendix
Numerical Assumptions and Design of
Simulations
Virtually any a priori belief about the magnitude of effects of tax asym-
metries might be confirmed by a cleverly constructed numerical ex-
ample. Many of these examples would have at least one practical an-
alogue somewhere in the corporate sector.
Because our examples are intended to bring out the general effects
of tax reform on tax asymmetries, a "representative" investment proj-
ect is called for. Therefore our numerical examples start with a base-
case investment project reflecting the implicit assumptions of the styl-
ized tax reform proposal we concentrate on. We want to avoid results
that might be construed as reflecting our choice of an atypical base-
case project. Our base project is therefore regular and unexceptional.366 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
Project Life under Certainty
If tax and economic depreciation are exponentially declining, we
want project cash flows to decline in the same way. Ignore taxes, and
consider a project requiring an investment outlay of 1, with expected
nominal cash inflows of y, = x, —FCt. FC, stands for "fixed cost,"
but for the moment we set FC, = 0.
If both the asset value and "variable" cash flow x, decay at the
expected nominal rate 8, project NPV for economic life Z/
8 is:
H
NPV = -1 + I Xoe-^+p+b'dt +
where r is the nominal risk-free interest rate, p a risk premium, r + p
is the expected opportunity cost of capital, and e-
{r+p+h)H is the present
value of the proceeds from sale of assets at t = H.
Since our simulations take place in a hypothetical risk-neutral world,
we may as well translate immediately to certainty equivalent flows.
The decay rate of the certainty equivalents of xt is 8 = 8 + p. Dis-
counting at the risk-free rate r:
H





Since this transformation does not affect NPV or decisions about proj-
ect life H, we assume certainty in the following discussion.
The project summarized by equation (Al) is nicely consistent, be-
cause the value of the stream of cash flows x, does decline at the
assumed rate 8. However, project or asset life has only a bit part in
the story. Remember that we assume certainty. If NPV > 0, the project
would never be voluntarily shut down; H could only be a date of
exogenous physical collapse. If NPV = 0, the natural base-case as-
sumption in a competitive economy, then dNVNIdH = 0 for any H.
In other words, the firm would be just as happy to shut down at H =
1 as at H = 100.
We can make project life a more interesting variable by introducing
fixed costs, FCt. Varying FCt will allow us to examine how the tax
system interacts with operating leverage. We also give variable cash
flow JC, a possibly different decay rate \.
H
(A2) NPV = -1 + e-<
r+*>
H + J xoe-








Note that fixed costs are assumed to increase at the inflation rate /.
Assuming initial NPV > 0 at some life H, project life is determined
by:
9





If one multiplies through by e
rH and translates to future values xH and
FCH,
(A3) dNPV/dH = xH - FCH - (r + h)SVH = 0,
where SVH is asset value at H. In other words, the project continues
as long as the cash inflow JC, exceeds the fixed cost FCt plus the op-
portunity cost of waiting a little longer for SVt. The opportunity cost
of waiting is the time value of money r plus the continuing depreciation
rate 8.
Now imagine a tax czar who models firm's investment decisions as
in (A2) and who wishes to assign economically sensible depreciation
rates and depreciable lives to various asset classes. Asset lives depend
on 8, X, FCQ, and JC0; x0 is our index of profitability. The czar would
take 8 and X as determined in product and factor markets. Competition
would force profitability toward the level x0, at which NPV = 0. Then,




The starting point for each of our numerical experiments is con-
sistent with this story. We pick pairs of 8 and depreciable life that
roughly correspond to those in the initial Treasury tax reform pro-
posal.
1
1 For each pair, various initial levels of fixed costs are assumed.
For each fixed cost level, the initial level x0 and decay rate X of cash
inflows are set so that NPV = 0 and optimal project life H equals the
depreciable life originally assumed. A numerical example is given in
table 11.6.
These base-case projects are only the starting points for our ex-
periments, which calculate how the present value of the firm's tax
liability depends on profitability levels, cash flow variances, the option
to end the project early or late, and of course, on the specific tax
rules.368 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
Table 11.6 Numerical Example of a Base-Case Project
Variable Definitions
y, = pretax cash flow = revenue — variable cost - fixed cost
x, = revenue - variable cost, which decays at the nominal rate X
FC, = fixed costs, which increase at the inflation rate i
r = nominal risk-free interest rate
SV, = asset values; SV0 = 1, the initial outlay; SV, decays at the nominal rate 8
CT| = variance rate of the realized cash flows x,
H = optimal project life under certainty
Base-Case Values
x0 = .259 X = .002
FC0 = .1 8 = .12
H = 12 r = .08
i = .06
ax = .15
Note: in real terms, cash flows decline at X + i = .062 per year.
Calculate NPV and Check Project Life
(A6) NPV = -1 + e-(r+m + _!°_ (J _ e-<r+x)H) r + X
_ I£lL (1 _ ^-W)
r — i
= - 1 + .0907 + 1.9778 - 1.0669 = 0
dNPV/dH = xH - FCH - (r + b)SVH = 0
= .2529 - .2054 - .0474 = 0
Abandonment Value
With ax = .15, and H = <», the NPV of the project with no abandonment is -2.84.
The value of the abandonment put with last exercise date at / = 100, is +3.13. Thus
adjusted NPV (APV) is:
APV = NPV + abandonment value
= -2.84 + 3.13 = .29.
NPV without abandonment and H = 12 is zero. Thus APV = + .29 is entirely due to
the option to end the project beofre / = 12 or to extend it to t = 13, 14, . . . , or 100.
Taxes and Project Life
Suppose the firm always pays taxes at the marginal rate T. Under
stylized tax reform:
H
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where:
e-(r+s)H Present value of asset at t = H. Since asset
values equal tax book value throughout, no
tax is paid at the end of project life.
H
C -(r + 8)f
+ I T(8 + i)e dt The present value of tax depreciation.
1
2 The
o depreciation rate is expressed in real terms
as (8 + /). Think of this as indexed depre-
ciation: higher inflation would be reflected
in a higher r and a smaller 8, that is, in
slower, possibly negative, decay of nominal
asset values. However, higher inflation
should not reduce tax depreciation as a frac-
tion of nominal asset value. Thus, we add
inflation back to keep the depreciation rate
in real terms.
By the way, the present value of nomndexed depreciation is:
H
|T(8
In this case tax depreciation charges decline at the real rate (8 + i)
even though inflation is positive and reflected in the nominal discount
rate.
The tax rules embodied in equation (A4) describe the "reformed"
tax system to be compared with current (1985) law. The only rule not
apparent from equation (A4) is the treatment of remaining book value
at H; we assume it is written off as a final, lump-sum depreciation
allowance.
The NPV formula with taxes (A4) simplifies





] r + 8
+ (l_-Jr)£o[1 r + X
_ (1 - T)FC0
r — i
The condition for optimal project life is:
(A6) dNPV/dH = xH - FCH370 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
In this setup, the "tax term" in brackets tends to shorten project life.
1
3
However, we do not assume that the tax czar takes tax effects such
as this into account in setting depreciation rates or asset life classes.
For our experiments, we define depreciation rates, asset lives, and so
forth, in terms of pretax cash flows.
Optimal Abandonment
When a project description like that given in table 11.A.I is handed
to the Monte Carlo simulation, the assumption of a fixed project life
H is left behind. Project life may be cut short if cash flows x, are
sufficiently bad or extended beyond H if they are sufficiently good.
The maximum project life is set far beyond H, at t = 100.
The option to choose project life can be modeled as a long-lived
American put, with varying exercise price, written on an asset with a
varying dividend yield.
1
4 The asset is the present value of future project
cash flows xt, assuming those cash flows will continue to evolve sto-
chastically out to the far distant future. When the put is exercised,
subsequent cash flows are given up in exchange for the exercise price.
In our examples, exercise price at t equals SVt, asset value at /, plus
the present value at t of subsequent fixed costs, which are avoided by
abandoning.
The optimal exercise strategy for the put gives the decision rule for
choosing project life, and the value of the put, usually labeled "aban-
donment value," is incorporated in adjusted project value.
1
5
Adjusted _ NPV with no Abandonment
NPV ~ abandonment (put) value
Abandonment value and the optimal abandonment strategy are cal-
culated numerically
1
6 using pretax cash flows. It would be nice to
explore how taxation affects the abandonment decision, but the com-
putational problems seem overwhelming once tax-loss carrybacks and
carryforwards are introduced. For example, including carry privileges
in the put-valuation program would require at least two additional state
variables: one for tax paid in the previous three periods and another
for tax-loss carryforwards. Some partial analyses of how tax asym-
metries interact with project life seem feasible, but we must leave them
for further work.
Summary
The procedures used in our numerical experiments may thus be
summed up as follows.
1. Choose an asset class described by a depreciation rate 8 and a
prespecified asset life. Assume an investment outlay of 1.371 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
2. For various levels of operating leverage, measured by initial fixed
cost FC0, pick the initial cash inflow x0 and its decay rate \ so that
project NPV = 0 and H, the optimal abandonment date under certainty,
matches the prespecified life for the asset class. This step sets the decay
rate \ and ensures that there is an initial cash flow level consistent with
NPV = 0 at the assumed fixed life H.
3. Pick a variance rate oi for the cash flow realizations x, and calculate
optimal abandonment strategy and abandonment values. The aban-




4. Calculate the after-tax present value of the project for different
levels of x0 under whatever tax rules are being investigated, assuming
that project life is terminated by the abandonment strategy calculated
in step 3. (For a few runs step 3 was "turned off" to check that our
qualitative results stand when project life is fixed.)
Notes
1. Since the value of a call option is convex in the exercise price (see Merton
1973), and no interest is paid on carry-forwards, it is always optimal to use
tax losses as soon as possible.
2. Boyle (1977) first used a Monte Carlo simulation technique to value a
European call option on a dividend-paying stock.
3. Constantinedes (1983) sets forth the conditions for a tax-paying entity to
realize tax losses immediately and to defer gains as long as possible.
4. Tax- loss carryforwards cannot be "sold" at face value via financial leases,
for example. A firm with carryforwards can sell tax depreciation deductions
to a taxable lessor, but the lessor has to pay taxes on the lease payments
received. The net gain to lessee plus lessor occurs only because tax depreciation
is accelerated relative to the lease payments. See Myers, Dill, and Bautista
(1976). Even if the firm with carryforwards (lessee) captures the full net gain
of the lease contract, it cannot capture what the depreciation tax shields would
be worth to a taxable corporation.
5. Issuing equity to buy bonds will be effective only under certain assump-
tions about debt and taxes. See Cooper and Franks (1983) for a discussion of
some of the financial transactions designed to exploit the firm's tax losses.
6. The percentages of firms with carryforwards is shown in Auerbach and
Poterba's table 10.1 (this volume). The percentages are much smaller when
weighted by the market value of equity, since firms with carryforwards tend
to be small and poorly performing. The transition probabilities are from their
table 10.7.
7. Our simulations of the stand-alone project show the maximum impact for
tax asymmetries on incremental projects undertaken by a going concern. That
is, the after-tax NPV of the stand-alone project is not reduced, and generally
is increased, by adding it to other assets subject to corporate tax. We make
this statement based on simulations in Majd and Myers (1985).372 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
8. Interpret ^asa precommitted shutdown date. Firms do not precommit,
but present value calculations usually assume they do. We relax this assumption
in the abandonment analysis described below.
9. Second-order conditions are satisfied in our examples.
10. The story now has some latent inconsistencies. First, as we will show,
taxes may affect asset values and lives. Second, we have not shown that
secondhand asset values would actually decline at a regular rate 8 when FC,
> 0. They would do so only if we introduced intangible assets, or at least
assets which are not depreciable for tax purposes.
11. U.S. Department of the Treasury (1984, vol. 2, chap. 8.01).
12. Depreciation tax shields should be discounted at r(l — T), the after-tax
riskless rate, since they are safe nominal flows under symmetric taxation. See
Ruback (1986). Thus, we have overstated the burden of a symmetric tax. We
accept this bias to ensure comparability with the risk-neutral option valuation
framework used in our simulation. The pretax risk-free rate is standard in that
framework. We are not certain that it should be when a long or short position
on an option is held directly by a corporation rather than by investors in its
securities. For now, we can only note this as an open issue.
13. We would hardly claim this as a general result. For example, taxes would
have no effect on project life providing depreciation is completed before H.
(This is common under current law.) The present value of depreciation tax
shields is then a "sunk" benefit and does not depend on H; all tax terms cancel
out of the derivative.
14. See Myers and Majd (1985). The dividend yield is just project cash flow
x, divided by the present value in t of expected subsequent cash flows xt+i,
xt+2, . . . . As in the Myers-Majd paper, the assumption is that yield depends
only on time, not on the outcomes x0, xu . . . , x,.
15. NPV with no abandonment is calculated on an underlying asset that lives
to t = 100, substantially greater than the optimal life under certainty. Thus
NPV with no abandonment is less than NPV from equation (A2). Abandonment
value more than makes up for this shortfall, so that adjusted NPV exceeds
NPV at the fixed-life H. See table 11.6 for an example.
16. The numerical procedure differs in three ways from that used in Myers
and Majd (1985). First, the uncertain cash flows x, are modeled as a process
with monthly (?/12) binominal jumps. Second, the present value of remaining
fixed costs is rolled into the exercise price. Myers and Majd (1985) ignored
fixed costs. Third, abandonment is not allowed before month 13.
Accuracy of the abandonment value calculations was checked by comparing
present results with results from the method used in Myers and Majd (1985),
and by computing abandonment values numerically for special cases for which
closed-form solutions are available.
17. The value of the option to extend project life is overstated in our sim-
ulations because we have not forced the firm to make replacement investments.
The decision to finally bail out is determined solely by the downward trend of
"variable" cash flow relative to fixed cost. However, this should not affect
the relative sizes of pretax and after-tax NPVs holding initial profitability and
risk constant.373 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
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Comment Joseph E. Stiglitz
This is an extremely interesting chapter. I want to make a few comments
suggesting some extensions to the authors' analysis and emphasizing
certain general implications of their approach.
1. Their analysis makes clear the importance of "options" analysis
for an understanding of tax consequences in the presence of uncer-
tainty. There are a variety of circumstances in which the taxpayer has
some discretion, for example, about the realization of a gain or a loss;
in those circumstances, ignoring uncertainty—that is, looking at the
tax consequences of the tax provision assuming there was no uncer-
tainty—can be highly misleading. We encountered another instance of
this in the analysis of churning. On average, it may not pay to churn.
But there are circumstances in which it does, for example, if there is
a large capital gain or if there is a change in the tax status of the owner,
so that the tax imposed on the seller is less than the tax write-offs
resulting from the step-up in basis for depreciation. (See J. E. Stiglitz,
"General Theory of Tax Avoidance," National Tax Journal, September
1985.)
It should be emphasized that these options affect the desirability of
investing in the given asset; that is, the appropriate way to value the
tax consequences of the demand for different investment goods is not
on the basis of an ex post analysis of actual taxes paid, but on the basis
of an ex ante analysis of the value of the option.
2. The authors' analysis also makes clear the potential importance
of disaggregating on the basis of tax status of firms. Earlier discussions
have focused on the importance of disaggregation across classes of
assets; one may get an inaccurate picture of the effect of the tax system
by looking at its effect on an average asset. Similarly, one may get an
inaccurate picture of the effect of the tax system by looking at its effect
on an average firm.
I should add that the effect of a tax on a firm will depend not only
on its tax status (whether it has loss carryforwards), but also on its
financial position; that is, whether at the margin it is financing its in-
vestment by raising new equity or by borrowing or out of retained
earnings.
3. A difficulty we have repeatedly encountered in the analysis of the
effects of taxation is that we would like to use a sophisticated max-
Joseph E. Stiglitz is professor of economics at Princeton University and a research
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.375 Tax Asymmetries and Corporate Tax Reform
imization model to describe the firm and the market and to evaluate
the effects of a proposed tax change and the responses of the firm
(investors). Yet we have considerable evidence that firms (investors)
do not act in accordance with our theory. How reliable then are our
inferences based on these models?
Here the issue is that there are numerous ways firms can seemingly
mitigate the effects of limitations on loss deductibility, for example,
through leasing. If these worked perfectly, then the tax status of the
firm would make no difference. More generally, the effect of these
provisions depends on how well these mechanisms work. These limi-
tations, and how they affect the behavior of the firm, have not been
modeled here; accordingly, how these limitations will operate in the
presence of a change in the tax law has not been analyzed.
4. How concerned we should be about limitations on the deductibility
of losses should also be affected by the extent to which the losses are
the result of discretionary actions taken to realize capital losses. Thus,
if a firm has an asset that has declined in value and sells that asset, it
will record a capital loss. But it could have waited to sell the asset. It
chooses to record the loss because of the tax advantages of doing so,
just as it chooses not to recognize certain gains.
5. The approach taken here is based on the premise that in valuing
risky streams there is a perfect capital market; the values calculated
are those that would emerge, if in fact these options could be sold on
the stock market. Two caveats are in order. First, the risk attitudes of
the government may differ from those in the private sector; thus, these
do not represent the value of these risky streams to the government.
Second, this approach will have to be modified if a change in tax policy
is contemplated that results in flows of funds from the government to
firms in states when they have losses (are near bankruptcy). For it is
precisely in those circumstances that the standard capital market models,
assuming full information, are most inappropriate. For instance, with
full loss deductibility the government is often pictured as a full equity
partner; alternatively, the government is sometimes said to be lending
money to the firm. But these metaphors, while suggestive, are not quite
accurate: the government's claims, particularly in the presence of bank-
ruptcy, may be quite different from the claims of another lender or
another equity investor.
6. The approach taken here is based on a simulation model, in which
an asset with a particular pattern of returns is investigated. The qual-
itative results that emerge are consistent with standard theory; for
example, the greater the risk, the greater the option value. But simu-
lation exercises are of particular use in assessing the quantitative sig-
nificance of an effect; however, it is difficult to ascertain, on the basis376 Saman Majd and Stewart C. Myers
of this one exercise, how robust the results are. Would they, for in-
stance, be modified if we considered a one-hoss-shay technology, or a
technology in which output and labor requirements are fixed but the
fixed lifetime of the asset is a result of rising real product wages?
7. Finally, it would be useful if the authors related their results to
the Auerbach-Hines results given in chapter 5.